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I want to discuss some economic challenges we face because of this “pandemic recession,” and 
how economic development policy can help.  
 
Here are four types of economic challenges we face: 
 
(1) The current pandemic recession has exacerbated many economic inequalities: regional 
inequality, income inequality, inequalities between big and small business, and 
inequalities across different racial groups.   
(2) The current pandemic has accelerated the trend toward remote work.   
(3) The current pandemic has revealed deficiencies in our current economic capacity to 
provide health-care services, including health-care-related manufacturing goods.  




Let’s begin with regional inequality. The current crisis has led to major increases in regional 
inequality. For example, in June of 2019, the five lowest unemployment states had an average 
unemployment rate of 2.5 percent, while the five highest unemployment states had an average 
unemployment rate of 5.3 percent, a gap of a little under 3 percentage points. In June of 2020, 
the five lowest unemployment states had an average unemployment rate of 6.5 percent, and the 
five highest unemployment rate states had an average unemployment rate of 15.7 percent, a gap 
of over 9 percentage points.  
https://www.bls.gov/web/laus/laumstch.htm 
 
This regionally divergent recession is of concern because more severe local recessions lead to 
persistent regional disadvantages. Research by my colleague Brad Hershbein and his coauthor 
Bryan Stuart finds that metro areas that experience more severe recessions tend to do worse even 
10 years later than otherwise comparable metro areas. If a metro area loses 5 percent more 
employment than an otherwise comparable metro area during a recession, its level of 
employment 10 years later will still be 6 percent lower than it otherwise would have been, and its 
employment-to-population ratio—its employment rate—will still be 2 percentage points lower. 
https://research.upjohn.org/up_workingpapers/325/ 
 
These persistent regional disadvantages occur in part because local job losses lead to a loss of job 
skills by local unemployed workers, increases in substance abuse and crime, increases in family 
problems, and declines in the quality of local public services. These local changes brought on by 




Therefore, the current pandemic will worsen the already large disparities in job availability 
across state and local areas in the United States. This accentuates the importance of using local 
economic development policies to help distressed areas. We know from prior research that if we 
can boost an area’s employment by 10 percent, this will boost its employment-to-population ratio 
(its employment rate) by 2 percent in the long run, on average.  In more distressed local labor 
markets, with lower prior employment rates,  job growth has even greater effects on long-run 
employment rates: in distressed local labor markets, a 10 percent increase in local jobs will boost 
local employment rates by over 3 percent, one-half larger than the 2 percent boost in the average 
local labor market. https://research.upjohn.org/up_workingpapers/308/  Both state and federal 
governments should do much more to target distressed local labor markets for greater economic 
development assistance. Doing so will not only help these distressed areas but will also help 
bolster overall state and national employment rates by moving more jobs to where the 
unemployed are.   
 
The pandemic recession has also had more negative effects on low-wage workers. From 
February through the end of May, employment of workers in the lowest quintile of wages 
declined by 30 percent, while employment of workers in the highest quintile of wages declined 
by only 5 percent.  https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/Cajner-et-al-
Conference-Draft.pdf  Surveys of households and businesses suggest that 20 to 40 percent of 





This accentuates the importance of targeting more job growth toward low-wage workers, which 
can be done if economic developers link their job-creation programs with the local workforce, 
and if workforce developers link their training programs with local employers. More jobs will go 
to more disadvantaged local residents if economic-development assistance packages include 
customized job-training programs, in which community colleges help train a firm’s workers. 
Such customized training programs help broaden the pool of who gets the jobs from economic 
development programs. We can also consider economic development job-creation subsidies that 
explicitly are tied to hiring the long-term unemployed, such as a program used by Minnesota in 
the 1980s called MEED program, an acronym for Minnesota Employment and Economic 




We also need to increase support for workforce development programs and community college 
programs that provide free or heavily subsidized skills training that is tied to jobs in demand in 
the local economy. Some useful models include Tennessee Reconnect, which provides free 
community college education leading to an associate’s degree or certificate for any adult in 
Tennessee ( https://www.nytimes.com/2020/05/14/opinion/free-college-adults-covid.html ). 
Another good model is Project Quest in San Antonio, which provides free community college 
job training and supports for in-demand jobs, which in San Antonio have recently been in the 
health-care sector.  Based on a randomized control trial, Project Quest leads to annual earnings 





The current pandemic recession also will hurt small businesses more than large businesses. The 
initial effects of the recession clearly fell harder on small business than on large business. From 
February to April, employment in businesses with more than 500 employees declined by 15 
percent, whereas employment in businesses with fewer than 50 employees declined by 25 
percent. By May, both groups were experiencing similar declines of around 15 percent. But 
among the small-business group, a higher percentage of the declines in employment stemmed 
from permanent closures. This suggests that this pandemic recession threatens to reduce the 
relative strength of the U.S. small business sector. https://www.brookings.edu/wp-
content/uploads/2020/06/Cajner-et-al-Conference-Draft.pdf  
 
These disproportionate effects of the pandemic on small businesses heighten the need for 
economic development policymakers to target the local small-business sector for greater 
assistance. Small businesses can be helped by various programs that provide high-quality 
business advice, such as Small Business Development Centers and manufacturing extension 
programs. State and local areas should consider trying to allocate some funding to expand such 
business advice services to small business. The research suggests that business advice programs 
are relatively cheap per job they create or save—the estimated cost per job created is between 
$15,000 and $35,000. 
https://research.upjohn.org/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1326&context=up_workingpapers  These 
business advice programs may need to be coupled with business financing programs that will 




The problems for low-wage workers and for small business are even greater for Blacks than for 
whites. Even after controlling for age, education, and family structure, Blacks, compared to 
otherwise similar whites, were 5 percentage points more likely to lose their jobs between March 
and April—and among those whites and Blacks who lost jobs between March and April, Blacks 
were 8 percentage points less likely to be rehired in May. https://www.brookings.edu/wp-
content/uploads/2020/06/Bartik-et-al-conference-draft.pdf  There also were more severe drops in 
business ownership among Blacks and other racial and ethnic minority groups. Between 
February and June, the number of white business owners in the U.S. declined by 5 percent, 
versus a decline in the number of business owners of other groups as follows: Blacks, 19 percent 
decline; Latinx, 10 percent decline; Asian, 10 percent decline; immigrants, 18 percent decline. 
https://people.ucsc.edu/~rfairlie/current/ 
 
These losses heighten the importance of special efforts both to increase employment among 
Blacks and to increase business ownership among Blacks. For example, a recent west Michigan 
program called HireReach has been working with some employers in the Grand Rapids area to 
encourage hiring based more on objective data than on subjective information, in an attempt to 
reduce unconscious biases as well as lead to better hiring decisions. The research so far suggests 
that HireReach doubles minority hires—and also reduces first-year turnover by 23 percent. 
https://research.upjohn.org/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1246&context=reports 
 
The pandemic is also likely to accelerate the trend toward remote work. For example, it is 
estimated that 40 percent of all jobs can be done from home, yet right now, only 10 percent of all 
jobs include a work-from-home component for even part of the work week, and only 3 percent of 
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all jobs are full-time work from home. https://bfi.uchicago.edu/wp-content/uploads/BFI_White-
Paper_Dingel_Neiman_3.2020.pdf  But based on surveys of employers, these percentages will 
roughly triple after the pandemic: 27 percent of all jobs will include a part-time work-from-home 
component, and 10 percent of all jobs will be full-time work from home.  
https://www.frbatlanta.org/blogs/macroblog/2020/05/28/firms-expect-working-from-home-to-
triple   
 
What policy response is needed for this increased trend toward remote work? Well, clearly there 
is uneven access to high-quality broadband, both by region and by economic class. There will 
need to be major investments to increase broadband access in rural communities. And if having 
high-quality broadband is increasingly necessary for many jobs, we will need to explore 
measures to establish reasonably high-quality broadband access as a public utility, and make it 
available at subsidized rates to all economic classes.   
 
The pandemic is also likely to increase interest in further development of greater capacity of 
health systems, including capacity for producing health-related manufactured goods, such as 
masks and testing equipment. I think there is likely to be a push for increased U.S. funding of 
health-related research, and of biotech industries, including biotech-related manufacturing.  
 
A key issue is whether this high-tech investment will only go to a few of the existing high-tech 
centers or be more broadly spread. Most high-tech growth has been focused on a few coastal 
metro areas.  https://philadelphiafed.org/-/media/covid/research-for-equity-in-recovery/place-
based-strategies.pdf?la=en  This concentration comes at a significant cost in lost jobs for much 
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of the United States. It also causes escalating housing prices and congestion problems in some of 
the coastal high-tech centers, such as San Francisco and Silicon Valley.  
 
There are some good proposals to reverse these trends. For example, Jonathan Gruber and Simon 
Johnson of MIT, in their 2019 book  “Jump-Starting America,”  propose increasing federal 
funding in health-care research and other research areas by $100 billion per year—and to target a 
large percentage of this research to 20 to 30 different research hubs around the nation, outside of 
the traditional coastal hubs. These 20 or 30 research hubs would be selected in a competition 
from among eligible metro areas, those which have sufficient technical personnel to be viable 
tech hubs. They identify 102 metro areas as potential tech hubs, from all regions of the country, 
including areas such as: the Lehigh Valley in Pennsylvania; Grand Rapids, Michigan; Kansas 
City, Missouri; Louisville, Kentucky; Tuscaloosa, Alabama; and Spokane, Washington.  
https://www.jump-startingamerica.com/policy-summary.    
 
State and local economic developers can help diversify high-tech growth geographically by 
supporting high-tech businesses, and by using manufacturing extension services and industry 
cluster programs to help manufacturers move into markets for health-care products, as has been 




Another challenge caused by the pandemic consists of the fiscal crises besetting state and local 




ojected%20to%20average%206.1%20percent.  along with estimates of how state and local tax 
revenue and needs for more spending respond to local unemployment, 
https://www.upjohn.org/research-highlights/proposal-timely-responsive-federal-aid-state-and-
local-governments-during-pandemic-recession  my predictions are that the state and local budget 
problem  will be about 15 percent of state and local budgets for 2020 and 2021, and will only 
slowly decline to a 5 percent problem by 2024 and 2025. About 90 percent of this budget 
problem is due to declining tax revenues from a slower economy; the other 10 percent is due to 
extra public spending that is necessitated by higher unemployment.  In dollar terms, the total 
state and local budget problem between now and 2025 amounts to about $1.4 trillion. I think it 
unlikely that federal aid will fully make up that gap, so state and local governments will need to 
take actions to cut spending and raise revenue.   
 
In this situation, economic development policy can help by proposing ways of raising state and 
local tax revenue that will not harm business investment and job creation. This can be done by 
having taxes and incentives favor new capital over old capital, and export-base businesses over 
non-export-base businesses. States and localities can do tax reforms that raise rates or close some 
tax loopholes, but offset these reforms for new capital investment in export-base industries. 
These offsets may be accomplished either with increases in discretionary business incentives for 
export-base businesses, or through increases in investment tax credits and job creation tax credits 




Additionally, I think economic development policymakers should explore developing a national 
compact that would prevent further escalation of discretionary incentives, which 
disproportionately go to large firms. Currently, state and local incentives for businesses cost 
communities around $45 billion per year. In terms of state and local budgets, this is less than 3 
percent of total state and local tax revenue. Thus far, the overall fiscal impact of incentives is of 
modest size. But some discretionary incentive offers, such as Wisconsin’s bid for Foxconn, or 
some of the Amazon inducements, have been about 10 times as great, whether per job or as a 
percent of investment. If all incentives similarly escalated to 10 times their current levels, they 
would significantly impinge on state and local budgets.  
 
One model for preventing further escalation of U.S. incentives is what the European Union (EU) 
does to cap incentive size.  Discretionary economic development incentives are legal in the EU. 
But in most of the EU, for large projects, discretionary incentives are limited to 3.4 percent of the 
investment amount, or 3.4 percent of the first two years of payroll, whichever is larger. In more 
economically distressed regions, the limit is five times this amount—either 17 percent of the 
investment amount or 17 percent of the first two years of payroll. So this would rule out some of 
the largest U.S. bids. For example, Foxconn was a $10 billion investment, and under EU rules, 
Wisconsin could have bid $340 million if southeast Wisconsin was not deemed distressed, and 
up to $1.7 billion if southeast Wisconsin was deemed distressed. But Wisconsin’s bid of $3.0 
billion would not have been permissible anywhere in the EU. Now, I think we can debate the 
limits—maybe we don’t want to have the federal government set incentive limits as low as the 
EU standard, or maybe we don’t want to have the federal government be charged with 
determining what areas are distressed or nondistressed. But I do think it might be prudent to have 
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some national limits on discretionary incentives, although not on entitlement incentives, which 
are written into the tax code and are automatic. In my view, to cap discretionary incentives in a 
politically sustainable way would require federal legislation, which is highly unlikely to pass 
unless a sizable majority of states got behind it.   
 
Let me conclude by simply listing some of the policy initiatives I have suggested today. In the 
aftermath of the pandemic recession, here are some changes in economic development policy 
that will help us have a more robust and equitable economic recovery:  
 
(1) More targeting of distressed regions, whose number will be growing because of the 
recession 
(2) More programs to make jobs more accessible to lower-wage workers, who are being 
adversely affected by recent economic trends 
(3) More programs to help small businesses rebound from the pandemic 
(4) More effective help for Black workers and Black-owned businesses 
(5) Greater investments in broadband access for all regions and economic classes 
(6) Diversification of high-tech beyond the coastal cities 
(7) Promoting advanced manufacturing industries that produce health-care-related products; 
(8) Designing business tax policies and incentives that will raise state revenue, while 
encouraging investment in base industries.  
 
Economic development policy alone cannot ensure a more robust and equitable recovery. But 
economic development policy can play an important supportive role in broadening the recovery 
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from this recession to include more regions, more businesses, and more economic classes and 
racial groups.  
 
 
